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COMMENTS
Planning Ahead: Consistency with a Comprehensive Land
Use Plan Yields Consistent Results for Municipalities
I. Introduction
Few areas of constitutional law have caused as much confusion among the
lower courts as the Supreme Court’s decisions on land use regulation.1  The
Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment has resulted in the adoption and
abandonment of a constantly evolving series of tests that have become
increasingly difficult for courts and local regulatory bodies to apply.2  In
particular, the Takings Clause has played a variety of roles in the past century,
from guarantor of private investment to endorser of ongoing regulation.3
Generally, the Takings Clause applies when a governmental body physically
invades or completely condemns a landowner’s property,4 but in the absence
of a physical invasion or condemnation, a state regulation of private property
may affect the land so significantly that it becomes a “regulatory taking”
which also triggers Fifth Amendment protection.5  Whether a challenged
taking is physical or regulatory, the Supreme Court’s review of takings
challenges is unlikely to yield any beneficial bright-line tests for physical or
regulatory takings in the foreseeable future.6
Instead of bright-line precedent governing the taking of property with or
without compensation, the Supreme Court has remained dedicated to ad hoc
analysis based on the circumstances present in each case.7  Because of the
flexible nature of the circumstances in each case, factors in the Court’s ad hoc
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analysis have proven difficult to consistently define when reviewing local
government decisions.8  Two examples make this point clear.  First, in the field
of physical takings, the “public use” restriction9 placed on private property
takings was recently analyzed by the Court and specifically limited to the facts
of the case.10  Second, with regard to regulatory takings, the Court has at times
examined a landowner’s “investment-backed expectations” in determining
whether a regulation constituted a taking of his property.11  Neither of these
standards provides substantial guidance for lower courts considering similar
issues.
This comment examines the difficulty local governments face in drafting
ordinances regulating land use that meet the nebulous criteria of Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence.  The following parts of this comment suggest that
state courts and legislatures, through their treatment of the relationship
between local comprehensive planning legislation and zoning ordinances, play
an important role in establishing certainty for local regulators under Supreme
Court takings law standards.  In particular, this comment argues that by
requiring zoning ordinances to remain consistent with the local government’s
comprehensive land use plan, state courts can ensure more predictable
outcomes under constitutional challenges and provide certainty for private
landowners.  
Part II of this comment describes the historical development of Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence and the current tests the Court applies to
challenges brought by landowners.  Part III describes the two major
approaches taken by state legislatures in setting a required level of consistency
between local zoning ordinances and local comprehensive land use plans.  Part
IV details particular aspects of takings law that cause significant uncertainty
among lower courts deciding such cases.  Part IV also examines the
effectiveness of the two major legislative approaches to zoning and their
impact on certainty under takings law.  Part V argues that the adoption of the
mandatory consistency approach improves practical aspects of local land use
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II. The History of Takings Jurisprudence
The authors of the Takings Clause assumed that government has the ability
to take private property through its power of eminent domain.12  The Takings
Clause places conditions on that power by requiring that the property be taken
only for public use and that the government compensate the owner.13  From its
inception, the Takings Clause has protected landowners in situations in which
the government permanently condemned or physically occupied a landowner’s
property.14  As currently interpreted, the Takings Clause also protects owners
whose property is not physically taken but is regulated to such an extent that
the court will consider it a taking, thereby triggering protection under the Fifth
Amendment.15  This part examines both physical and regulatory takings law
history, specifically discussing how the Supreme Court has shaped its takings
doctrine concerning two issues: (1) when a regulation goes far enough to be
considered a taking and (2) when a physical taking is considered to be for
“public use.”  An understanding of the Court’s historical approach to these two
situations is essential for state governments who wish to develop land use
regulation policy that will stand favorably against constitutional challenges.
A. Regulatory Takings History
Before 1922, states were free to impose regulations on private property so
long as the Court could find authority under the state’s police power.  This, in
turn, required a determination that the regulation was necessary to abate a
public nuisance.16  If the Court identified a public nuisance on the property in
question, the state’s police power automatically permitted the government to
regulate the property without considering harm to the owner.17  The U.S.
Supreme Court gradually replaced such a broad interpretation of the police
power in land use regulation cases in favor of the view that when a “regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”18  The following is a history of
the Supreme Court’s transition from rigid, nuisance-based deference to a
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system of ad hoc standards that provides more flexibility in protecting
landowners from regulatory takings.19  
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: The Birth of Regulatory Takings
The Court first considered deviating from its nuisance-based policy in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,20 in which the Court finally considered the
issue of land use regulations’ effects on property value under a Takings Clause
analysis.  In Mahon, a coal mining company challenged a state law effectively
prohibiting the company from mining certain coal deposits deemed necessary
to support the surface, thereby constituting a potential nuisance to owners of
the surface property.21  The majority opinion authored by Justice Holmes
balanced the public benefits of the statute against the private injury suffered
by the owner, concluding that the regulation had gone “too far” and required
compensation under the Takings Clause.22  The opinion failed to establish a
clear test for determining when the balance tipped in the landowner’s favor
and thus required compensation.  Instead, the Court merely declared that the
distinction between regulation that involved valid use of the police power to
abate a nuisance without compensation and regulation that involved a taking
requiring compensation was a question of degree.23  Thus, the Mahon Court’s
analysis under the Takings Clause opened the door for future regulatory
challenges by ruling that it was possible to find a taking even when the
regulation was originally justified by a public nuisance.24  
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.: Upholding Zoning
Ordinances
Four years after it decided Mahon, the Supreme Court harkened back to its
policy of deferring to local government’s land use regulation when it upheld
a zoning ordinance in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.25  The city
implemented a typical zoning plan forming districts and restricting land use to
certain purposes within each district.26  The plaintiff owned land in a district
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that was no longer zoned for use in an industrial capacity and claimed that the
deprivation of his ability to use his land for industrial purposes was a due
process and equal protection violation.27  The Euclid Court reverted to its pre-
Mahon position and held that when the state used its police power validly to
prevent a public nuisance at the expense of restricting land use, the state was
not required to compensate the owner.28
3. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York: The Balancing
Test
Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court analyzed regulatory takings
challenges under the pre-Mahon nuisance standard, determining that a state
may regulate without compensation those land uses the Court found to be
obnoxious to the public.29  In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, however, the Court added to the Mahon rule, holding that a land use
regulation could go “too far” and thus require “just compensation.”30  Penn
Central owned Grand Central Station in New York City and had applied to the
city for a building permit to construct a fifty-five-story tower on top of the
station.31  The city agency in charge of the application denied Penn Central’s
request, because construction of the tower violated the city’s landmark
preservation ordinance which considered the station a landmark.32  Penn
Central claimed that the preservation ordinance’s restriction as applied to its
property was a regulatory taking requiring compensation.33
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion found that Penn Central was not a case
in which the regulation went so far as to be labeled a taking, but formulated a
new regulatory takings test in the process.34  To analyze an alleged regulatory
taking, the Court listed three factors for balancing public benefits with private
injury.35  The factors were: (1) the economic impact on the owner; (2) the
“character of the governmental action”; and (3) the extent to which the
regulation interfered with the owner’s “distinct investment-backed
expectations.”36
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In crafting this test, the Penn Central Court failed to clearly define the term
“investment-backed expectations.”  Justice Brennan, however, relied heavily
on this factor to find that no taking existed in this case because Penn Central
was still able to earn a reasonable return from its property by doing what it had
always done — operating passenger trains.37  By confining its analysis of the
owner’s current investment-income expectations instead of future income
expectations, the Court added a specific standard to determine when a
regulation went “too far,” causing a private injury that outweighed the public
benefit.
The Penn Central factors are still used in a large number of regulatory
takings cases.  In particular, the “investment-backed expectations” factor has
been heavily relied upon despite causing significant debate when a government
actor restricts a landowner’s desired use of his property.38 Subsequent Supreme
Court case law has elaborated on this factor,39 but for a number of reasons
discussed later,40 the “investment-backed expectations” factor has not served
as a precise measure for balancing a regulation’s public benefit against a
private injury.
4. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles: Temporary Regulatory Takings
After Penn Central, the next significant contribution to ad hoc regulatory
takings law was Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.41  Following a
devastating flood, the county enacted a moratorium forbidding all construction
and improvements at the plaintiff’s campground.42  The Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether, if the ordinance constituted a taking, the county
was required to compensate the church for the period of time between the
enacting of the ordinance and the judicial determination that a taking had




45. Id. at 319.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 315.
48. Id. at 321.  The First English concept of allowing a landowner to recover compensation
from a government actor based on prior regulation is known as “inverse condemnation” and
subjects a multitude of temporary regulations to a possible compensation requirement.  Id. at
318.  Further, the issue of compensation for a temporary regulation subjects a broader range of
municipal ordinances, including those that are only designed to delay a particular use of land,
to scrutiny under the Takings Clause.  See id.
49. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
50. Id. at 611.
51. Id. at 614.
52. Id. at 627.  
53. Id.
time governing the taking was compensable.44  Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
the prescribed remedy covered a period of time beginning with the regulatory
event that imposed the conditions amounting to a taking rather than the formal
judicial declaration that a taking had occurred.45  Such a remedy existed even
if the regulation had since ceased.46  
The First English holding suggested that the Takings Clause is remedial,
rather than prohibitive, in nature.47  In other words, the Takings Clause does
not forbid the government from taking private property, but merely provides
the owner with a remedy in such a case.  Although the First English majority
distinguished compensable temporary takings from “normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the
like,” the imaginary line between a taking determined on the facts and a
“normal delay” poses ambiguity.48
5. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: Clarifying the Role of Investment-Backed
Expectations
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,49 the Supreme Court returned to the
“investment-backed expectations” factor, altering this already confused aspect
of takings determinations.  In Palazzolo, the landowner brought a takings
challenge based on a state coastal wetlands regulation prohibiting construction
on his land.50  Notably, the owner received title to his property after the
regulation was enacted — a fact that worked to automatically bar the takings
claim, according to the state.51  Although the Court refused to find a taking, it
refuted the state’s argument.52  In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy noted
that takings jurisprudence had established that some regulations “are
unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or title.”53
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
80 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:73
54. Id.
55. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
57. Id.
58. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306. 
59. Id. at 337.
60. See id.
Based on Palazzolo, a property owner’s “investment-backed expectations”
will not be literally construed against him based on regulations in force at the
time the owner took title to the property.  In other words, the Court will not bar
a takings claim simply because the owner had notice of a regulation’s
application to his property at the time he received the property.54  As a result,
the Palazzolo “investment-backed expectations” holding eliminated any hope
that courts could rely on such a concept as a bright-line test in ruling on
regulatory takings.
6. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, Inc.: Temporary Takings Under the Penn Central Balancing
Test
Confirming the Court’s adherence to ad hoc balancing, Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, Inc.55 lessened the scope of the Supreme Court’s only per
se regulatory takings test to date.56  This test, developed in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, created a per se takings rule to apply when an
owner is deprived of all viable economical use of his property.57  In Tahoe-
Sierra, the Court addressed the issue of whether a temporary moratorium on
construction and development should constitute a per se taking.58  The Court
held that temporary regulations cannot result in a per se taking but must
instead be analyzed under the Penn Central factors.59  Consequently, the
number of takings challenges that can be determined based on a per se rule are
extremely limited, and the Penn Central factors, and all of the debate and
uncertainty surrounding them, are the chief means for deciding regulatory
takings.60
As a result of the above cases, regulatory takings doctrine currently requires
an ad hoc analysis under the Penn Central factors to determine whether a
regulation has gone too far, therefore requiring just compensation.  The
exception to the use of ad hoc analysis arises when an owner is deprived of all
economical use of his property, thereby invoking a per se taking under Lucas.
Additionally, in the case of temporary regulations, ad hoc analysis under Penn
Central, and not a per se taking, is always appropriate in determining whether
Fifth Amendment protection applies.
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B. Physical Takings History
Courts must not only decide whether a regulation has gone too far and has,
thus, become a taking, but also whether a physical invasion or condemnation
of private property satisfies the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on physical takings is less complex than
its regulatory takings history because of the Court’s presumption that a
physical invasion of property is more onerous than mere regulation of use;
therefore, the Court does not balance factors to find that a “taking” has
occurred.61  The following two cases represent the Supreme Court’s approach
to the government’s physical invasion or condemnation of a landowner’s
property.
1. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.: Physical Taking Per
Se Rule
In Loretto, the Supreme Court reviewed a New York statute requiring
landowners to permit the installation of equipment by cable television
companies on the landowners’ property.62  The petitioner purchased a building
with an existing cable line in place along the building’s roof and exterior
wall.63  The landowner claimed that the statute allowing the cable company to
install its equipment mandated a physical invasion of her property that
qualified as a taking under the Fifth Amendment.64  The Supreme Court agreed
with the landowner and created the per se rule that all permanent physical
invasions of property were considered takings under the Fifth Amendment.65
Because the New York statute effected a taking, the Supreme Court required
the state to pay at least a nominal amount of compensation.66 
2. Kelo v. City of New London: Defining the “Public Use” Requirement
Under Loretto, all permanent physical invasions of property invoke the
Takings Clause, but a physical invasion must also satisfy the Fifth
Amendment’s “public use” requirement.  This requirement represents the most
recent Takings Clause debate.  In Kelo v. City of New London,67 the Supreme
Court interpreted “public use” broadly in holding that the city could use its
power of eminent domain to acquire property that it planned to transfer, at
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69. Id. at 472 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
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72. Id. at 485-88.
73. Id. at 482-83.
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least in part, to private businesses.68  The government had instituted a
comprehensive development plan designed to “revitalize an economically
distressed city” by attracting jobs, increasing tax revenue, and improving the
city aesthetically.69  After citing a number of cases that shared the Court’s
broad view, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, argued that the definition
of “public use” had long ago exceeded its literal constraints, and instead was
interpreted to require that the government’s interest in the property serve a
“public purpose.”70  According to Stevens, even government projects that did
not result in use by the public were still deemed to serve a “public purpose” if
they presented a benefit to members of the public.71
Nevertheless, the Kelo Court stressed its reluctance to apply bright-line tests
to takings challenges and insisted that its holding was limited to the facts
presently before it.72  Justice Stevens reasoned that classification of a
governmental act as one that served a public purpose was a task for the
legislature and, thus, deferred the public purpose determination served in Kelo
to the legislature.73  Because the city viewed the enactment of a comprehensive
development plan as the best solution to its economic stress problem, the Court
applied a rational basis review, refusing to interfere with New London’s
decision, because the plan’s goal served a legitimate public purpose and the
plan itself was rationally related to achieving it.74
In addition to granting general deference to local government decisions,
Justice Stevens noted that the presence of a comprehensive plan served to
define the public purpose and allowed the Court to simultaneously review the
rights of all the owners affected.75  In contrast, the use of eminent domain to
transfer property from one private owner to another in the absence of a
comprehensive plan “would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose
was afoot.”76  Thus, the Kelo opinion set the precedent that local government
can ensure greater deference to its regulatory scheme through the use of more
comprehensive land use planning.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/3
2007] COMMENTS 83
77. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
78. Id. at 397.
79. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1997);
Clark v. Town Council, 144 A.2d 327, 332 (Conn. 1958).
80. Donna Jalbert Patalano, Police Power and the Public Trust: Prescriptive Zoning
Through the Conflation of Two Ancient Doctrines, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 683, 688-89
(2001).
81. Id.
82. Stuart Meck, The Legislative Requirement that Zoning and Land Use Controls Be
III. The Relationship Between Zoning and Comprehensive Land Use
Plans — Two Approaches
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., discussed above, the Supreme
Court implied that courts should review challenges of zoning ordinances,
among other comprehensive land use plans, in a manner similar to other types
of regulatory takings cases.77  The Euclid Court held that the states’ police
powers give them the authority to divide land into exclusive zoning districts
according to type of use, building height, and lot size and to establish different
restrictions that apply to each district.78  
Thus, a preliminary overview of Euclid land use regulation techniques
available to state and local governments is a necessary prerequisite for a
discussion of which techniques are constitutionally and practically favorable.
The following parts provide an explanation of provisions included universally
in enabling statutes, an overview of how state legislatures differ in delegating
to local government the power to enact comprehensive land use plans and
zoning legislation, the standards by which the state courts review local zoning
legislation, and the role that local comprehensive land use plans play in that
standard.
A. Enabling Statutes
Under the U.S. Constitution, local governments have no inherent authority
to regulate land use; they must derive their authority from the state
legislature.79  Each state has created enabling legislation that authorizes
municipal governments to draft land use plans and zoning ordinances in their
respective areas.80  A typical enabling statute grants municipalities the power
to regulate land use for the purpose of promoting the public’s health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.81  
As a result of such delegation of the state’s police powers, the
municipalities’ actions taken pursuant to the police power are subject to the
same constitutional standards of review as actions taken by the state itself
pursuant to such powers.82  In addition to Takings Clause constraints, typical
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J.L. & POL’Y 295, 297 (2000).
83. Id. at 297-98.
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85. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT],
reprinted in MODEL LAND DEV. CODE app. A (Tenative Draft No. 1, 1968).
86. Ross D. Cohen, Why Require Standing if No One Is Seated?  The Need to Clarify Third
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(2004). 
87. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 85, § 1, at 4-5.
88. Id. § 2, at 6.
89. Id. § 3, at 6-7.
90. Id. § 3 & n.22, at 6.
enabling legislation imposes further restrictions on the local government’s
regulatory authority.83  These restrictions include limitations on purposes that
justify regulatory actions, requirements for the organization of regulatory
agencies, and the imposition of procedural safeguards.84
A review of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) provides a
basic understanding of the common conditions that legislatures place on the
authority they delegate to municipalities.85  The United States Department of
Commerce drafted the SZEA in 1926, and it has since served as the template
for the majority of state enabling statutes.86  While the SZEA’s basic structure
and some of the original language have survived, each state may adjust its
enabling legislation to address evolving land use needs.  These changes can
severely impact a local zoning policy’s structure and its constitutional validity.
Prior to detailing these modifications and their effects, however, one must
review the SZEA, as it serves as the starting point for typical state enabling
legislation.
Sections 1 through 3 of the SZEA function as a grant of zoning authority to
the local municipality.  The first section of the SZEA, like most state statutes,
begins by expressly granting the state’s police power to the municipality for
the purpose of regulating various aspects of local land use.87  The next section
of the SZEA permits the local government to divide land in its jurisdiction into
districts for any of the regulatory purposes allowed under the statute.88  The
third section of the SZEA lists the specific purposes for which zoning
ordinances may be enacted.89  This section also requires that zoning ordinances
“be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan,” and that “[n]o zoning
should be done without . . . a comprehensive study.”90  The stated purpose for
the comprehensive plan requirement is to “prevent haphazard and piecemeal
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/3
2007] COMMENTS 85
91. Id. § 3 n.22, at 6.
92. Id. §§ 4-5, at 7-8.
93. Id. § 6, at 8-9.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. § 7, at 9.
96. Id. at 11.
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zoning.”91  Nevertheless, the SZEA neither defines the term “comprehensive
plan,” nor elaborates on the procedure for developing one.
Sections 4 through 6 of the SZEA provide procedural requirements for the
exercise of the authority granted in section 1 through 3.  Sections 4 and 5 of
the SZEA outline the procedure a municipal body must use to adopt zoning
legislation and to consider petitions to amend or make exceptions to its
legislation.92  Section 6 allows the municipality’s legislature to appoint a
zoning commission, whose task it is to advise the legislature on its regulatory
decisions.93  The legislature is not bound by the commission’s
recommendation, but it cannot take action without first receiving the
commission’s report.94
Sections 7 and 8 of the SZEA provide for review and enforcement of the
municipality’s actions under sections 1 through 6.  Section 7 permits the
appointment of a board of adjustment to decide when it is appropriate to
deviate from the requirements of the municipality’s ordinances.95  The SZEA
restricts the board of adjustment’s discretion in granting variances to situations
in which doing so “will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will
result in unnecessary hardship.”96  In addition, section 7 provides the state
court appellate procedure for appeals of board of adjustment decisions.97
Finally, section 8 empowers the local legislature to draft ordinances for the
purpose of enforcing its acts under the enabling statute, including punishment
of violations by misdemeanor.98
In summary, the SZEA and its successor enabling statutes describe the
scope of the police power that states delegate to their local governments.
Because the delegated powers are specifically enumerated rather than general,
a municipality’s authority to regulate land use is subject to more restrictions
than just those in the U.S. Constitution.  One such limitation is the list of
acceptable regulatory purposes for regulation provided in section 3 of the
SZEA.99  The series of procedural requirements for passing legislation and
making amendments detailed in sections 4 and 5 represents another such
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limitation.100  For purposes of this comment, however, the most important
enumerated limitation is the requirement in section 3 that zoning legislation
“be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”101
B. Differing State Requirements for Consistency with a Comprehensive
Land Use Plan
The limitations placed on municipal land use regulation by state enabling
statutes affects how the state courts review challenges to such regulations
brought by landowners.102  In particular, the role that a state assigns a
municipality’s comprehensive land use plan is decisive in establishing the
level of discretion the municipality has in drafting zoning ordinances.103  States
fall into one of two general categories with regard to the role assigned to a
comprehensive plan: majority or minority.  
Enabling statutes in majority states do not require mandatory consistency
with a comprehensive plan, and therefore grant local legislators more
discretion to make regulatory land use decisions that fall outside the scope of
their comprehensive land use plan, if a plan is even required.104  Minority
states have enacted enabling legislation mandating that each zoning ordinance
be strictly consistent with a comprehensive land use plan developed by the
municipality.105  The minority position has the effect of limiting local legislator
discretion to actions within the scope of an existing comprehensive land use
plan.106  Whether a state requires mandatory or nonmandatory consistency with
a comprehensive plan is sometimes the creation of judicial interpretation,
rather than a difference in the literal reading of the enabling statutes.107  As
mentioned above, many states borrow their enabling statute language
regarding comprehensive plans from section 3 of the SZEA, which states that
zoning ordinances “shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
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1. Majority States: Nonmandatory Consistency with a Comprehensive
Plan
Most states are nonmandatory states, meaning that their legislatures, courts,
or both do not require each municipality to maintain strict consistency between
every zoning ordinance the municipality enacts and the municipality’s
comprehensive land use plan.110  Three subcategories exist within the
nonmandatory category.  First, states such as Oklahoma do not require any
level of consistency between zoning ordinances and a comprehensive land use
plan.  In fact, these states do not require the existence of such a plan at all;
therefore, these states forego a review for consistency and review such zoning
ordinances under a rational basis standard.111  The second subcategory of
majority states, including Arizona, does not require each municipality to enact
a comprehensive land use plan, but, if such a plan exists, these states require
some level of consistency between a municipality’s zoning ordinances and a
land use plan.112  The third subcategory of majority states, including Virginia,
requires both the existence of a comprehensive land use plan in each
municipality that wishes to enact zoning ordinances and some level of
consistency, but these states do not require strict compliance between the
zoning ordinances and the comprehensive plan.113
a) Oklahoma: Comprehensive Land Use Plan Not Required and Rational
Basis Review of All Zoning Ordinances
The Oklahoma enabling statute is an example of legislation in majority
states that delegates zoning authority to municipalities without requiring the
passage of strictly consistent regulations and land use plans.114  It is typical for
enabling statutes in majority, nonmandatory states to require some type of
relationship between zoning legislation and a comprehensive plan, but usually,
as is the case in Oklahoma, these provisions are not interpreted to require strict
consistency with a comprehensive plan.115  Instead, courts in majority states
grant zoning ordinances a presumption of validity, and defer broadly to the
municipality’s discretion under a variety of standards of review regardless of
the ordinances’ relation to a comprehensive plan.116
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As an example, the Oklahoma statute provides that “[m]unicipal regulations
as to buildings, structures and land shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.”117 Oklahoma courts, however, do not impose any
restrictions on municipalities’ zoning power beyond that which is present in
the U.S. Constitution.118  Oklahoma courts review zoning decisions under a
common standard known as the “fairly debatable” standard.119  An ordinance
reviewed under this standard is upheld if “reasonable men [could] differ as to
whether [it] is reasonable.”120  The “fairly debatable” standard is a product of
constitutional analysis of substantive due process challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment and not a statutorily imposed restriction on municipal
regulatory power.121  The “fairly debatable” standard is the functional
equivalent of the “arbitrary and capricious” or rational basis standard and
provides a great deal of deference to local government regulatory decisions.122
Therefore, in Oklahoma, the state legislature grants to municipalities the full
authority of the state’s police power regarding land use regulation and imposes
no additional conditions in the enabling statute.
Holtzen v. Tulsa County Board of Adjustment123 is an example of the
deference Oklahoma courts afford zoning decisions.  In Holtzen, the county
had a comprehensive land use plan in place which did not include uses
creating amusement park rides.124  Nevertheless, the county’s board of
adjustment granted a special exception to its zoning legislation permitting the
applicant to build a roller coaster in an area zoned for agricultural use only.125
The parties agreed that the special exception was clearly in conflict with the
plan.126  Despite this, the court held that when there was a conflict between a
zoning action and a land use plan, the zoning ordinance controlled.127  Thus,
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In addition to deferring to local legislatures’ ability to draft regulations
inconsistent with a comprehensive land use plan, Oklahoma courts do not even
require a comprehensive plan beyond the zoning ordinance itself.129  In Tulsa
Rock Co. v. Board of County Commissioners,130 the plaintiff mining company
purchased an unzoned tract of land it wished to mine.131  The local legislature
then zoned the entire area for agricultural use and prevented the company from
conducting its mining operations.132  In upholding the board’s decision, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals stated that a comprehensive plan did not
have to exist outside of the zoning ordinance and that the ordinance could
stand on its own.133  Further, the court applied the deferential “fairly debatable”
standard to the ordinance; such that, in light of the valid ordinance, no mining
operations were allowed to commence.134
In short, Oklahoma’s enabling statute provision, which reads “in accordance
with a comprehensive plan,”135 has been interpreted by its courts as eliminating
a comprehensive plan requirement  and, therefore, provides municipal
legislators’ zoning decisions significant deference.136  As Part IV of this
comment discusses, states whose courts interpret such provisions in this
manner risk depriving their citizens of the benefits associated with a distinct,
written comprehensive land use plan.  Further, this interpretation could deprive
their municipalities of the constitutional certainty a comprehensive plan
provides.
b) Arizona: Judicially-Created “Basic Harmony” Consistency
Requirement
Some majority states do not require that a written comprehensive land use
plan exist, but, when one is in existence, these states require some level of
consistency.137  Arizona interprets its comprehensive land use plans in such a
fashion.138  The Arizona enabling statute states that “[a]ll zoning and rezoning
ordinances or regulations adopted under this article shall be consistent with
and conform to the adopted general plan of the municipality, if any, as adopted
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under article 6 of this chapter.”139  The statute expressly relieves the
municipality of any requirement to draft a comprehensive land use plan.140
And, similar to Oklahoma courts, Arizona courts do not require the existence
of a comprehensive land use plan.141  Oklahoma and Arizona differ, however,
in the level of judicial deference granted when a comprehensive plan is in
place.  Haines v. City of Phoenix142 illustrates this difference.  
In Haines, a resident challenged a rezoning that allowed a builder to
construct a 500-foot-tall tower in a zone that otherwise permitted structures a
maximum of 250 feet in height.143  The resident claimed the rezoning decision
violated the enabling statute’s requirement that any city ordinance “be
consistent with the adopted general or specific plans of the municipality.”144
Although the court affirmed the city council’s motion for summary judgment,
the Arizona Court of Appeals, unlike the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals in
Holtzen, refused to apply the rational basis standard in its review of the
rezoning decision and, instead, applied a heightened standard to the city’s
rezoning decision.145
Applying a stricter standard than rational basis, the Haines court reasoned
that the state legislature’s inclusion of a consistency requirement in its
enabling statute evidenced its intent to impose restrictions on the city’s zoning
powers beyond the restrictions imposed by the U.S. Constitution.146  Therefore,
application of the rational basis standard of review, appropriate in substantive
due process challenges, gave no effect to the enabling statute’s consistency
requirement, but, instead, would treat the Constitution as the only check on the
city’s zoning power.147  The court defined “consistency” under the meaning of
the Arizona enabling statute as those zoning decisions that were “in basic
harmony with the general plan.”148  Despite its more exacting standard,
however, the court held that the rezoning decision under review was in “basic
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of the plan.149  For instance, the plan sought to increase commercial
development in the area, free up open space, and provide opportunities for
landscaping.150  Further, the height restrictions were only mentioned in
precatory language of the plan.151  Thus, the rezoning ordinance furthered each
of the plan’s goals to the extent it could be considered in “basic harmony” with
the city’s general plan.152
The “basic harmony” standard employed by Arizona courts reflects lesser
deference to the municipality’s regulatory discretion than that of Oklahoma’s
“fairly debatable” standard.  Although neither state’s enabling statute requires
a written comprehensive plan,153 Arizona courts at least afford the legislature’s
call for consistency with existing comprehensive plans some meaning.
Comprehensive land use plans, therefore, play a greater role in Arizona where
local governments have an incentive to commit resources to research and
development of community master plans.  Likewise, members of the
community benefit from the likelihood of greater economic certainty once a
land use plan is in place, because the courts have assured landowners that
further action by the local government will at least be in harmony with the
goals of the plan.
Because it does not require a comprehensive land use plan to be in place
before the municipality can enact zoning ordinances, however, the Arizona
enabling statute as interpreted may have the perverse effect of discouraging the
adoption of such plans in the first place.  Local legislators wishing to maintain
heightened discretion in their zoning decisions could simply avoid creation of
any type of official land use plan that might later act as a barrier to regulatory
actions.  Therefore, in Arizona, economic certainty for landowners is reserved
for members of communities whose governments have opted to tie their future
zoning decisions to some type of comprehensive land use plan.
c) Virginia: Statutory Requirement for Existence of a Comprehensive
Plan and “Reasonable Consistency” Requirement for All Zoning
Ordinances
The approach of some nonmandatory states closely reflects the
comprehensive land use plan requirements of mandatory states.  Such states,
Virginia for example, require the existence of a comprehensive land use plan
as a prerequisite for the power to enact zoning ordinances.154  Additionally,
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these states require some level of consistency, short of strict consistency,
between zoning decisions and the plan.155  The Virginia enabling statute
requires that “every governing body shall adopt a comprehensive plan for the
territory under its jurisdiction,” and provides specific elements that must be
present in each plan.156  Specific elements include “long-range
recommendations for the general development of the territory covered by the
plan” and “a transportation element that designates a system of transportation
infrastructure needs and recommendations.”157  The Virginia enabling statute
also requires that “zoning ordinances and districts shall be drawn and applied
with reasonable consideration for . . . the comprehensive plan.”158
Municipalities in Virginia who wish to enact zoning ordinances are therefore
obligated to ensure that such a plan exists and to consider plans in existence.159
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the predecessor statute160
to the current enabling statutes, which contained the current statutory
requirements.161  In Town of Jonesville v. Powell Valley Village Ltd.
Partnership, the plaintiff-builder received a zoning permit under existing town
zoning ordinances.162  The town subsequently amended its zoning ordinance
in a manner that precluded the builder’s desired land use; the builder then
applied for a building permit based on the previous zoning ordinance.163  The
town denied the building permit, and the builder sought declaratory relief in
state court.164  
The builder asserted that the zoning ordinance was invalid because the town
had failed to adopt a comprehensive plan beforehand.165  The town claimed
that the ordinance itself contained the elements required of a comprehensive
plan, but merely failed to label itself as such.166  The Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed with the builder.  Because several elements required by the
enabling statute were missing from the ordinance,167 the court concluded that
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the town’s zoning ordinance did not achieve the status of a comprehensive
plan, and was therefore invalid under the Virginia statute.168
Virginia’s policy of mandating the existence of a comprehensive land use
plan in each municipality addresses the concerns of uncertainty present in
Oklahoma and Arizona.169  The builder in Powell Valley Village is an example
of a landowner who benefited from the certainty that accompanies the required
existence of a land use plan in his community.170  According to the Powell
Valley Village court, comprehensive plans “provide[] a guideline for future
development and systematic change, reached after consultation with experts
and the public.  ‘[T]he Virginia statutes assure [landowners] that such a change
will not be made suddenly, arbitrarily, or capriciously but only after a period
of investigation and community planning.’”171  When a municipality is forced
to both research its future land use options and publish the results of that
research through a comprehensive land use plan, the security of landowner
expectations and the encouragement of real estate investment are likely results.
Nevertheless, because Virginia’s enabling statute calls for “reasonable
consideration” of the comprehensive plan in all zoning ordinances,172 it is still
one step short of inclusion with minority states that require strict consistency
between zoning ordinances and the comprehensive plan.
2. Minority States: Mandatory Consistency with a Comprehensive Plan
A minority of states mandate that municipalities make all zoning ordinances
strictly consistent with a comprehensive land use plan.173  In these minority
states, the legislature, the courts, or both require municipalities to draft a
comprehensive land use plan and then treat it as a legally binding document
for the purpose of enacting zoning ordinances.174  Initially, the policy of
requiring consistency with a comprehensive plan was adopted through
litigation.175  Recently, however, many states which mandate consistency with
a comprehensive plan have enacted their mandatory policy through
legislation.176  Regardless of the mechanisms for instituting a mandatory
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consistency policy, such a policy results in less zoning discretion for
municipalities, as they are confined by the provisions in their own
comprehensive land use plans.177
a) California: Mandatory Compatibility with the Goals and Objectives of
the Comprehensive Plan
California’s enabling statute expressly requires all zoning ordinances to be
“consistent with the general plan of the county or city.”178  The statute’s
definition of “consistency” requires satisfaction of two conditions: (1) that
such a plan first be officially adopted and (2) that zoning ordinances be
“compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses, and programs
specified in the plan.”179  This definition of consistency is similar to the
consistency policy enforced in majority states such as Virginia, which also
require a comprehensive land use plan to be in place prior to the enacting of
zoning ordinances and requires “reasonable consistency” between zoning
ordinances and the comprehensive plan.180  Unlike Virginia courts, however,
California courts require more than “reasonable consistency” between zoning
ordinances and comprehensive plans by requiring compatibility with the
specific objectives of the plan.
The difference between Virginia’s and California’s requirements lies in the
level of deference afforded to municipalities’ zoning decisions.  Although the
Virginia legislature requires both the existence of a comprehensive plan before
zoning ordinances can be enacted and “reasonable consistency” between the
plan and the ordinance,181 Virginia courts view the comprehensive plan as “an
advisory guide that does not bind the locality.”182  Thus, the comprehensive
plan is only one factor under the “reasonable consistency” analysis applied by
Virginia courts, which tend to focus more on the reasonableness of the zoning
decision as it relates to the public’s general welfare rather than as it relates to
the comprehensive plan.183  Further, Virginia courts give great deference to
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In contrast to Virginia courts, California courts that review zoning decisions
strictly interpret California’s compatibility requirement.  Rather than simply
considering the comprehensive plan as one factor in a reasonableness
analysis,185 California courts apply mandatory consistency, requiring that all
zoning ordinances strictly conform to the comprehensive land use plan.186
Thus, the comprehensive plan must contain a statement of the city’s
development policies and objectives,187 and a reviewing court will invalidate
all zoning ordinances containing objectives that are inconsistent with the
policies and objectives expressed in the comprehensive plan.188
Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek is an example of a
California court’s application of the zoning enabling statute’s compatibility
requirement.189  In Lesher, the city passed an initiative measure that limited
municipal growth.190  The court, however, considered the city’s comprehensive
land use plan to be “growth oriented” because its objectives included
expansion of residential and commercial areas and densities as well as
encouragement of development.191  As a result of the incompatibility between
the antigrowth objectives of the city’s initiative ordinance and the growth-
oriented goals of the city’s comprehensive plan, the court ruled that the
ordinance was invalid.192  The city argued that the initiative ordinance operated
as an amendment to the comprehensive land use plan and that, therefore, no
need existed to find compatibility between the two.193  The court rejected such
an argument because the electorate who passed the ordinance was notified that
it was approving an ordinance — not an amendment to the city’s
comprehensive land use plan.194
The court also rejected the related argument that the voters’ willingness to
condone the antigrowth objectives of the ordinance was enough evidence to
show that the voters intended to amend the comprehensive plan.195  The court
found that allowing an ordinance to transcend the objectives of the
comprehensive plan would render the compatibility requirement in the
enabling statute meaningless.196  If the court held otherwise, every zoning
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ordinance that conflicted with the comprehensive plan could be considered
evidence of intent to overrule the comprehensive plan, negating the
legislature’s intent to make comprehensive plans binding as to all future
zoning ordinances.197
California legislative and judicial insistence on a binding comprehensive
land use plan places California in the minority of states as a “mandatory”
state.198  While California and Virginia occupy the middle ground on the
mandatory versus nonmandatory spectrum, the two states are distinguished by
the level of deference given to municipalities when zoning ordinances are not
entirely consistent with an existing land use plan.199  In a nonmandatory state
such as Virginia, municipality discretion still remains, even where the court
identifies inconsistency between a municipality’s zoning ordinance and the
comprehensive land use plan.200  In a mandatory state such as California,
however, a finding of inconsistency between a zoning ordinance and the
comprehensive plan will render the ordinance invalid.201  Some mandatory
states, such as New Jersey, however, require even greater consistency
regarding the requisite level of consistency between zoning ordinances and the
comprehensive land use plan than California.202 
b) New Jersey: Substantial Consistency with the Master Plan
The New Jersey zoning enabling act, New Jersey’s enabling statute, further
removes municipalities’ zoning discretion by requiring that “all of the
provisions of such zoning ordinance or any amendment or revision thereto
shall either be substantially consistent with the land use plan element and the
housing plan element of the master plan or designed to effectuate such plan
elements.”203  The enabling statute also specifies the means by which a
municipality may overcome the consistency requirement, entailing a vote of
a majority of the full governing body, typically a city council.204  Thus, the
New Jersey statute requires greater consistency than the California statute,
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consistency” with particular elements of the plan and specifies the only means
by which the “substantial consistency” requirement can be foregone.205
New Jersey courts have strictly applied the substantial consistency
requirement to challenged zoning decisions.206  In East Mill Associates v.
Township Council, the Superior Court of New Jersey reviewed an ordinance
that rezoned an area from one that permitted apartment buildings to one that
only permitted single family residences.207  A landowner challenged the
ordinance under the New Jersey enabling statute, claiming that the ordinance
was not substantially consistent with the township’s land use plan.208  The
Superior Court sided with the landowner, ruling that the ordinance was
inconsistent with the land use plan because the plan called for the land in
question to be used for industrial purposes.209  As a result, the township’s
ordinance was held to be invalid, and the property was again zoned to permit
construction of apartment buildings.210
The consistency policies in mandatory states such as California and New
Jersey create a different regulatory environment than in nonmandatory states,
because zoning decisions made by the local legislators in mandatory states are
limited by more than the legislature’s discretion and judicial review under a
rational basis standard.211  Instead, municipalities in mandatory states are
required to express their informed policies in a published comprehensive land
use plan and do not have discretion to act outside the parameters set forth in
such a plan.212  As a result, individual zoning decisions in mandatory states are
part of a more predictable pattern based on compliance with the policies and
goals the municipality has already expressed in its land use plan.213  Thus,
landowners in mandatory states are able to make more informed decisions
about future uses of their property without the same concerns of sudden,
undirected changes in zoning policy present in nonmandatory states.214  In
addition to landowner certainty, strict consistency requirements produce
certainty for municipalities in the face of landowners’ constitutional challenges
to zoning decisions.
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IV. The Effectiveness of the Mandatory Consistency Approach in
Addressing Areas of Uncertainty in Takings Law: Public Use and
Investment-Backed Expectations
A state’s choice between adopting a mandatory or nonmandatory approach
to consistency between zoning ordinances and comprehensive land use plans
affects the decisions of individual landowners and local governments within
the state.215  Specifically, the decision impacts the future formation of land use
policy in each municipality and investment decisions made in the private
market.216  In mandatory states, local governments are compelled to make
careful decisions regarding long-term land use regulation, and landowners
enjoy more certainty in their property investments based on the comprehensive
plan’s land use policies combined with the knowledge that such policies will
be given effect in zoning ordinances.217   In nonmandatory states, local
governments are less likely to be concerned with researching and
implementing detailed plans for future land use policy, because such planning
is not required to enact zoning ordinances.218  Landowners in nonmandatory
states are, therefore, more likely to experience uncertainty and hesitation in
their property investment decisions given that zoning decisions are not
necessarily predicated by a carefully considered comprehensive land use plan
and are limited only by the municipalities’ discretion.219
In addition to addressing long-term city planning and landowner concerns,
mandating consistency between zoning ordinances and land use plans
increases the likelihood that local ordinances are constitutionally valid.220  Two
types of landowner challenges under the Takings Clause, regulatory takings
challenges and “public use” challenges, are particularly threatening to
municipalities’ efforts to enact valid land use ordinances.221  First, zoning
ordinances are threatened by Penn Central’s doctrine that regulation may go
“too far” and, thus, become a regulatory taking.222  Municipalities have an
interest in ensuring that their zoning ordinances do not result in a taking,
because such a ruling diminishes the local governments’ resources either by
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forcing them to pay compensation to landowners or by forcing them to
abandon the regulation and start over with a new ordinance.  Second, even if
a municipality is willing and financially able to compensate landowners of
condemned property, the municipality may face a suit challenging and
invalidating the ordinance as an unconstitutional taking that was not for
“public use.”223  Such a finding forces a municipality to abandon a regulatory
scheme on which it had likely spent time and resources and to initiate another
regulation capable of withstanding a Takings Clause challenge.
Furthermore, in the case of either a regulatory taking or a “public use”
challenge, the municipality incurs litigation costs in defending the challenge.224
Therefore, municipalities have a strong interest in accurately predicting which
ordinances might fail either a regulatory takings challenge or a public use
challenge.225  Because Supreme Court decisions addressing regulatory takings
and “public use” are governed by uncertain ad hoc analysis,226 a municipality’s
ability to predict the type of regulation that will remain valid under the
Takings Clause is uncertain.
A state’s decision to adopt a mandatory land use policy can circumvent the
uncertainty surrounding U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings and “public
use” decisions.  In short, states can mitigate these two forms of constitutional
uncertainty inherent in drafting valid ordinances by requiring a comprehensive
land use plan to be in place in each municipality and by requiring that
ordinances be consistent with that plan.
A. The Effect of Mandatory Consistency on the Uncertainty Surrounding
“Investment-Backed Expectations”
A significant source of the confusion surrounding regulatory takings
decisions stems from the Supreme Court’s consideration of a landowner’s
investment-backed expectations as one of the three factors the Penn Central
Court presented in its regulatory takings test.227  Because regulatory takings
jurisprudence now requires use of Penn Central’s ad hoc analysis in all
regulatory takings challenges except those involving permanent deprivation
of all use of the property, a landowner’s investment-backed expectations play
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a primary role in determining whether a regulation has gone too far, thus
requiring the payment of compensation.228
In considering the investment-backed expectations of a landowner who
brings a regulatory takings challenge, the Supreme Court has refused to
consider dispositive a landowner’s awareness of regulatory restrictions on his
property at the time of its acquisition.229  In rejecting this so-called “notice
rule,”230 the Supreme Court has held that Penn Central should not be
interpreted as considering such knowledge by the landowner an absolute bar
to his ability to challenge the regulation as a taking.231  Instead, the Penn
Central holding requires consideration of the overall reasonableness of the
regulation based on the three Penn Central factors, including the landowner’s
investment-backed expectations.232  Thus, although the U.S. Supreme Court
does not recognize a per se “notice rule,” Penn Central still requires analysis
of a landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations at the time he
acquired the property.233  According to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
in Palazzolo, the regulations that existed at the time the landowner acquired
the property in question help define the reasonableness of the owner’s
expectations and should, therefore, be given consideration in deciding whether
a regulatory taking has occurred under Penn Central.234
After Palazzolo, however, investment-backed expectations are not
considered a bar to nor a controlling factor in favor of a takings claim.235
Additionally, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a clear template for the
amount of weight given to the regulatory environment that existed at the time
the owner acquired his property.236  The absence of a clear rule leaves lower
courts free to deny regulatory takings claims as long as they find that a
landowner’s expectations as to the use of his property were not reasonable as
of the time he acquired the property.237  This means that if a local legislature
can establish that a landowner challenging zoning legislation had
unreasonable expectations at the time he acquired the property, the ordinance
is likely to withstand scrutiny under the Takings Clause.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/3
2007] COMMENTS 101
238. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
239. 873 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
240. Id. at 461.
241. Id.




A municipality could establish that a landowner’s investment-backed
expectations were unreasonable at the time of acquisition if the municipality
shows that he was on notice of a zoning regulation that prohibited the use for
which the landowner seeks approval.  Although the Palazzolo holding
prohibits treating the notice issue as controlling, Justice O’Connor’s opinion
in that case makes it clear that the regulations in place at the time of
acquisition contribute to the reasonableness analysis.238  Because the regulatory
environment in place at the time the challenging owner acquires the property
is relevant to the determination of whether the owner has reasonable
investment-backed expectations, the existence of a comprehensive land use
plan creates an advantage for a municipality attempting to uphold its land use
legislation against a takings claim.  A municipality with a comprehensive plan
that extensively addresses the property and use in question is more likely to
prove that an owner was on notice regarding what uses of the property were
reasonable than a municipality with a plan containing very little regulation or
a municipality with no comprehensive plan at all.
A 2004 Florida District Court of Appeals case illustrates this point.  In Leon
County v. Gluesenkamp, the court denied a landowner’s temporary regulatory
takings claim.239  In Gluesenkamp, the county entered a development
agreement with a landowner for road expansion and storm water management
projects.240  The landowner subsequently sold his property to a new owner who
applied to the county for a permit to construct a residence under the existing
development agreement.241  Other local owners successfully challenged the
development agreement as contrary to certain storm water provisions in the
county’s comprehensive plan.242  As a result, the trial court enjoined the county
from issuing development permits to its counterparty landowner under the
development agreement.243  The county complied with the injunction, and even
entered a settlement agreement in which it agreed not to challenge the trial
court’s decision.244  The new owner of the enjoined property sued the county,
alleging that a regulatory taking occurred for the period of time during which
the county refused to issue a development permit or to appeal the trial court’s
injunction.245
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In the new owner’s takings case, the appellate court held that the county’s
action did not constitute a regulatory taking, because, at the time the new
landowner acquired the property, he did not have a reasonable expectation to
develop his residential property under the development agreement.246  The
court held that even though the new landowner was not on notice that his
development permit would be denied or enjoined at the time he acquired the
property, he did have notice that such a permit was in conflict with the
comprehensive plan, requiring further water studies before development could
be allowed.247  In denying the takings claim, the court relied on the
inconsistency between the owner’s expected use and the storm water
provisions of the comprehensive plan.248  The presence of a comprehensive
plan can, therefore, be the difference in a constitutional and an unconstitutional
land use ordinance.
The Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra Supreme Court decisions also highlighted
the significant role a comprehensive land use plan plays in assuring that local
legislation will survive a regulatory takings challenge.249  In both decisions, the
Court declined to adopt a per se takings rule regarding investment-backed
expectations based on the timing of acquisition in relation to the timing of the
regulation but, instead, required an ad hoc analysis of the reasonableness of the
owner’s expectations under Penn Central.250  In both Palazzolo and Tahoe-
Sierra, the Court did not reach a decision regarding the reasonableness of the
owner’s expectations, but reviewed evidence that would likely contribute to
such a decision on remand.251  In particular, the regional governments’
regulatory bodies in both cases were acting under extensive, preexisting
comprehensive plans.252  Further, the Court’s discussion of the elements of
these plans implies that, at the time of acquisition of their respective
properties, such elements were inherent in the owners’ expectations.  Such
evidence was not substantial enough to create a per se takings rule, but would
be influential in determining the reasonableness of the owners’ investment-
backed expectations.253  
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Specifically, the Palazzolo Court refused to apply a per se rule that would
eliminate a takings claim based strictly on the acquiring owner’s notice of a
plan, as the elements of the plan could have been unreasonable, regardless of
the relative timing between the plan’s passage and the owner’s acquisition.254
Because an ordinance passed under an unreasonable plan element might not
provide an owner adequate notice, such an owner’s takings claim could
continue under Penn Central’s investment-backed expectation factor.255  In
Palazzolo, the Court discussed the goals of the Coastal Resources
Management Council’s wetlands protection plan in a manner that did not
suggest any unreasonableness inherent in the plan.256  On remand to analyze
the case under the Penn Central factors, the lower court would likely consider
the application of the Council’s extensive wetlands plan to be reasonable based
on the deference afforded to government land use plans in cases such as
Kelo.257  Such a presumption would contribute to the idea that any owner’s
expectation contrary to the plan was in turn unreasonable, most likely negating
the takings claim under Penn Central.  As with Palazzolo, the Tahoe-Sierra
Court discussed the government’s comprehensive plan in detail, implying that
the elements of the plan were reasonable, considering that the Court refused
to make a per se ruling in favor of the challenging property owner.258  
Other holdings from lower courts support the idea that some form of
detailed government planning with goals contrary to that of an individual
landowner is strong evidence that the owner’s expectations are
unreasonable.259  Such a view suggests that it is advantageous for state
enabling statutes to require local governments to adopt a comprehensive land
use plan and adhere to the plan throughout the course of its zoning legislation.
The beneficial impact of such consistency extends beyond analysis of
investment-backed expectations to other elements of takings jurisprudence,
such as “public use.”
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B. The Effect of Mandatory Consistency on the Uncertainty Surrounding the
“Public Use” Requirement
In addition to the difficulty involved in shaping a standard for investment-
backed expectations under Penn Central, another area of constitutional
uncertainty facing local legislatures is whether condemned property serves
“public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause.260  The Supreme Court
addressed the meaning of “public use” in a condemnation case when it decided
Kelo.261  The Kelo Court refused to establish a bright-line test for determining
whether a “public use” was present, but, instead, limited the holding to the
facts present in the case.262  As a result of that decision, defining the limits of
“public use” in a physical taking is still unclear to local governments and
lower courts.  Nonetheless, the Kelo decision provides the most current
guideline for local regulators who want to ensure that their physical taking of
private property will not violate the Fifth Amendment.
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens wrote that a strict definition of
“public use” was not to be applied when evaluating a municipality’s decision
to condemn private property.263  Instead, the municipality must only have a
“public purpose” in mind for the property.264  Thus, whether a municipality’s
condemnation project serves a public purpose depends on whether the
municipality’s primary goal is to benefit the public, even though it provides
a windfall to private parties.265
As evidence that the goal of the project in the Kelo case was to provide a
primarily public benefit, Justice Stevens noted that the physical taking was
“executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan.”266  The
Court considered the purpose of the city’s comprehensive plan, facilitating
economic development in the community, to be a public purpose.267
Considering that the condemnation of private property at issue in Kelo was
executed pursuant to a comprehensive plan, the Court determined that the
condemnation of the property also served a public purpose.268
Such “public purpose” reasoning of the Kelo Court appears to grant a
significant amount of deference to local governments because, as long as the
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comprehensive plan serves a public purpose, the purpose of each component
of that plan will be labeled “public” as well.269  This deference combined with
the Supreme Court’s history of applying the traditional rational basis test to
“public use” challenges creates a great deal of flexibility for local governments
seeking to condemn private property.
Despite the Supreme Court’s history of deferring to governmental “public
use” classifications, a court may not give such deference to a municipality’s
definition of “public use” if the municipality either insufficiently articulates
its plans for the condemned property or fails to convince a court that the plans
are designed to serve a public purpose.270  In that event, no deference can be
given, and a court will be forced to articulate its own reasons and goals for the
condemnation, which may not bear a rational relationship to the condemnation
action itself.  According to the Kelo Court, a reliable way for a municipality
to convince a court that a legitimate public purpose underlies the
condemnation is to execute the taking pursuant to a carefully designed and
communicated comprehensive plan.271  Thus, state legislation mandating both
the creation of a comprehensive plan and the consistency of future local
condemnations with that plan increases the likelihood that courts will view
condemnations favorably against “public use” challenges.
V. Other Benefits Resulting from a Mandatory Consistency Policy: More
Efficiently Planned Communities and Certainty Against Due Process
Challenges
The potential benefits created by mandatory consistency with a
comprehensive plan extend beyond reassuring municipalities that local zoning
regulations will withstand Takings Clause challenges.  Additional benefits
include more efficiently planned communities and certainty against due
process challenges.
As a city grows, the need for land use regulation and city planning becomes
more pronounced.  Population growth creates greater competition for each
parcel of land and increased traffic, noise, and pollution.  The municipality
must regulate structure size, parking, and type of use for each parcel to
maintain order in the face of increasing density.  As a city spreads
geographically, the municipality must restrict which parcels of land it will add
to the city, because extending services such as roads, schools, water,
electricity, police, and fire to new properties drains the municipality’s
resources.
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As a result of these evolving needs, municipalities are compelled to alter or
add zoning regulations.  To enact such regulations without comprehensive,
long-term planning increases the chances that uninformed or subjective land
use regulation decisions will occur.272  This reality is reflected in the judicial
policy that greater deference should be given to a municipality’s authority
under its police power when the municipality is legislating pursuant to a
comprehensive land use plan.273  State legislatures that mandate consistency
with a comprehensive plan are more likely to position cities in their state for
orderly and efficient growth over the long term.
Constitutional validity under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment274 represents another benefit resulting from carefully designed and
implemented comprehensive land use planning.  Local governments’ authority
to draft zoning legislation is based on the police powers delegated by state
legislatures.275  Under the Due Process Clause, this power does not extend to
government regulation that is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”276
Since Euclid, local legislatures have been free to draft a large variety of zoning
ordinances to restrict various forms of private land use.277
If, however, a local governments’ zoning ordinance does not meet due
process requirements as expressed in Euclid, then the ordinance will not
receive the customary deference given to such regulations.278  Thus, it is the
goal of municipalities to draft legislation that a court will not view as arbitrary
or unreasonable with relation to the goal of serving the public safety and
welfare.  As stated in Kelo and in Forestview Homeowners Association v.
County of Cook, the Court will look more favorably upon an ordinance or
condemnation that is placed in effect as part of an organized, comprehensive
land use plan.279  Because such an ordinance or condemnation is less likely to
be labeled by the court as arbitrary or unreasonable, it is in the best interest of
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municipalities to draft and adhere to such a plan, and in the best interest of
state legislatures to require that all municipalities in the state do so.
VI. Conclusion: The Universal Benefits of Mandatory Consistency in
Zoning
Each state must make a decision regarding the role that comprehensive land
use plans will play in cities’ zoning schemes.  The potential roles that cities’
comprehensive land use plans play fall along a spectrum.  For states at the
discretionary end of the spectrum, the plan serves as a mere guide for local
zoning regulators, who maintain discretion to pass zoning ordinances of their
choice without regard to a land use plan.  For states at the mandatory end of
the spectrum, a plan must be enacted and thereafter serves as binding law on
local zoning regulators for every zoning ordinance passed in the future.  In
between these extremes, states use the existence of a plan as a presumption of
validity for zoning ordinances that have been challenged as invalid, or the
absence of a plan as a presumption of invalidity.
States that place themselves near the mandatory end of this spectrum enjoy
some advantages.  First, greater consistency between a comprehensive plan
and zoning ordinances creates certainty for municipalities that zoning
ordinances will withstand challenges brought by landowners under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Such certainty derives from a comprehensive
plan’s role in defining “public use” for a given regulatory project as well as in
providing notice to landowners of a regulatory scheme, thereby shaping the
owners’ investment-backed expectations.  Second, a high level of consistency
benefits landowners and the local property market by creating a predictable
regulatory environment in which real estate investments can be made with
confidence.  Third, zoning regulation that must follow a well developed and
predictable comprehensive land use plan helps cities grow in an organized and
efficient fashion.  Finally, a consistent relationship between a comprehensive
land use plan and zoning regulation fortifies zoning ordinances against
substantive due process challenges by providing evidence that each ordinance
is not arbitrary or capricious, but is, instead, part of an organized and carefully
considered land use plan.
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